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Explaining Trade Agreements: The
Practitioners’ Story and the Standard Model
DONALD H. REGAN*
University of Michigan Law School

Abstract: There are two widely accepted explanations of why politically
motivated governments make trade agreements. There is an informal explanation,
which I shall call the ‘practitioners’ story’, even though it is most economists’
informal view as well. And there is a formal explanation in the economics
literature, which I shall call the ‘standard model’, referring to the basic structure
shared by the Bagwell–Staiger and Grossman–Helpman models. Unfortunately,
the practitioners’ story and the standard model contradict each other at every
crucial point. For example, in the practitioners’ story, trade agreements are about
reducing politically motivated protectionism; and getting an agreement depends
on political support from exporters. But in the standard model, trade agreements
never reduce such protectionism; and politics plays no role in securing an
agreement. This paper expounds the contradictions between the practitioners’
story and the standard model, which have gone largely unremarked. It refutes
suggestions by defenders of the standard model that the contradictions are
illusory. It identiﬁes the different assumptions made by the two explanations that
generate the contradictions. It gives reasons for skepticism about the standard
model. And it discusses why all of this matters.

1. Introduction
Here is a conundrum. The best-established economic model of trade agreements
(speciﬁcally, the core structure shared by the Bagwell–Staiger model1 and the
Grossman–Helpman model2) is fundamentally and completely inconsistent with
most trade practitioners’ understanding of trade agreements. Indeed, it is
inconsistent with most economists’ informal understanding of trade agreements.

* Email: donregan@umich.edu.
I am very grateful to Bill Ethier and Henrik Horn for encouragement and instruction over many years; and
to Gene Grossman, Bob Staiger, and Alan Sykes for generously spending time to educate someone who
fundamentally disagrees with them. For very helpful comments on drafts, thanks to Chad Bown, Bernard
Hoekman, Doug Irwin (so long ago he may not remember), Keith Maskus, Petros Mavroidis, Joost
Pauwelyn, and Kamal Saggi. Also to Alan Winters and anonymous reviewers for the World Trade Review.
Errors and misunderstandings that remain are, alas, my very own.
1 Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002).
2 Grossman and Helpman (1995).
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And almost no one seems to notice, or to regard this situation as worthy of
discussion.
I wrote a paper some years ago in which I expressed skepticism about the
Bagwell–Staiger model, mainly on the ground that it could not explain actual trade
agreements.3 But I did not appreciate then the depth of the contradiction between
the Bagwell–Staiger/Grossman–Helpman model and what I shall call the ‘practitioners’ story’, the informal story of how trade agreements come about that is
told by practitioners and economists alike. There is nothing in the literature that
fully explores the contradictions between the best-established formal model of
trade agreements and almost everyone’s informal view.
I will describe the mechanisms of the practitioners’ story and the Bagwell–
Staiger/Grossman–Helpman model in Section 2, but the core contradictions
they generate are easily stated. First, and crucially, in the practitioners’ story,
governments make trade agreements to reduce protectionism. But in the Bagwell–
Staiger/Grossman–Helpman model, trade agreements will never reduce protectionism as we normally understand it. This leads to a further contradiction. In the
practitioners’ story, getting a trade agreement requires mobilizing political
support for the agreement from export interests. But in the Bagwell–Staiger/
Grossman–Helpman model, politics plays no role in explaining why we get an
agreement.
It is a remarkable proposition that, in the best-established model, trade
agreements never reduce protectionism. Some readers may suspect I am relying
on an idiosyncratic notion of ‘protectionism’. But what I mean by ‘protectionism’ is
exactly what we all commonly mean in this context. Protectionism is unilateral
trade policy that restricts imports in order to get political support for the
government from import-competing producers.4 Most of us think trade agreements
are primarily about restraining protectionism in this sense. But in the Bagwell–
Staiger/Grossman–Helpman model, trade agreements never reduce protectionism
in this sense. The sole function of trade agreements in the Bagwell–
Staiger/Grossman–Helpman model is to eliminate terms-of-trade manipulation,
unilateral trade policy that aims at improving the home country’s terms of trade.

3 Regan (2006).
4 Incidentally, although we do not usually bother to specify what the import-competing producers are
lobbying for, we usually assume implicitly that they are lobbying for protection against foreign competition
in order to increase their producer surplus. I mention this because in the Bagwell–Staiger model producers
may, and in the Grossman–Helpman model producers will, lobby also over their share of distributed tariff
revenue and their consumer surplus. I shall suppress further mention of these possibilities, which are hardly
ever mentioned outside the Grossman–Helpman model; this will simplify the exposition without changing
the conclusions. (This means I am speaking loosely when I say below that Grossman and Helpman’s
‘political-support’ terms, or Bagwell and Staiger’s ‘politically optimal tariffs’, represent the protectionist
component of the unilateral tariff. Strictly speaking, they represent the government’s response to lobbying
over domestic prices. This includes protectionism, but it also includes the government’s response to
lobbying by producer groups over their consumer surplus, if any.)
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Terms-of-trade manipulation is a completely distinct phenomenon from protectionism, reﬂecting a different governmental motivation. Protectionism aims to
affect domestic relative prices, in response to special-interest politics; terms-of-trade
manipulation aims to affect world prices, to increase national income.
I cannot emphasize too strongly that the distinction between protectionism
and terms-of-trade manipulation is a matter of the government’s motivation,
not the tariff’s effects. Appreciating this point is crucial to understanding the
Bagwell–Staiger/Grossman–Helpman model. As I shall explain below, both the
Bagwell–Staiger model and the Grossman–Helpman model distinguish explicitly
between the political motive for tariffs and the terms-of-trade motive. And in both
models, a trade agreement will eliminate only tariffs (or the portions of tariffs) that
are motivated by terms-of-trade considerations; the agreement will not reduce
tariffs (or the portions of tariffs) that are motivated by politics. Consider a tariff
imposed by a large country on a good that is also produced domestically. This tariff
will have both a protective effect for the import-competing industry and a termsof-trade effect. But whether the tariff is protectionism, or terms-of-trade
manipulation, or both, depends on whether the government is aiming at the
protective effect, or at the terms-of-trade effect, or both. And in the Bagwell–
Staiger/Grossman–Helpman model, how far a trade agreement will reduce the tariff
varies according to the motivation.
For convenience, I shall hereafter refer to the Bagwell–Staiger/Grossman–
Helpman model as the ‘standard model’. Some people have objected that my real
target is just the Bagwell–Staiger model, and that the Grossman–Helpman
model allows trade agreements that reduce protectionism. We shall see that that
is not true. Grossman and Helpman do not call attention to the paradoxical
consequences of their model, as Bagwell and Staiger do; and it may seem hard to
believe that a model of trade agreements that includes a detailed micro-politics of
protectionism could not allow trade agreements to reduce protectionism. But that
is what the model says. So far as trade agreements are concerned, the core
structure of the Grossman–Helpman model is the same as the core structure of the
Bagwell–Staiger model.
Other people have objected to my calling the Bagwell–Staiger/Grossman–
Helpman model the ‘standard model’, on the ground that there are other models
out there, such as commitment models.5 Commitment models may explain some
trade agreements, but they cannot explain agreements like the WTO. In the
commitment models, the government commits itself by a trade agreement in order
to forestall choices by domestic investors that would lead the government to
adopt ex post a protectionist policy it does not want ex ante. But such models
cannot explain how a trade agreement can reduce tariffs that are already in
place. Nor do they capture the importance of reciprocity in trade agreements.

5 E.g., Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998).
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Indeed, the commitment models do not even involve the kind of ‘commitment’ that
probably has most practical signiﬁcance in the real world. In the commitment
models, the ‘audience’ for the commitment is domestic investors, and the
government’s fundamental preferences are stable. But in the real world, most
governments that seek commitment by trade agreements are trying to advertise
their liberalization to the world, or to tie the hands of future governments with less
liberal fundamental preferences.
Finally, some economists have objected to my calling the Bagwell–Staiger/
Grossman–Helpman model the ‘standard model’ on the ground that they do not
accept it. But if some economists do not accept the Bagwell–Staiger/Grossman–
Helpman model, there are many who do (or who say they do – some people claim
to accept the model, but also tell the practitioners’ story when talking informally).
There is no other model with remotely the same presence in the literature as
the Bagwell–Staiger/Grossman–Helpman model, nor with the same degree of
(nominal) acceptance. So I shall call the Bagwell–Staiger/Grossman–Helpman
model the ‘standard model’ for lack of a better name; I hope readers who reject
the model will be molliﬁed by this acknowledgment. I also hope some of them
will take the phrase as a challenge to displace the current ‘standard model’ with
something better.
Here is the program for the rest of the paper. In Section 2, I begin by presenting
the practitioners’ story, the informal story that most of us (when thinking
informally) regard as explaining trade agreements. I then sketch intuitively
the workings of the standard model. And I explore the contradictions between
the practitioners’ story and the standard model. In Section 3, I discuss (and reject)
some arguments offered by defenders of the standard model to show that the
practitioners’ story is just a particular case under the standard model; or to show
that somehow the standard model can allow trade agreements that reduce
protectionism after all. In Section 4, I explain how the different results in the
practitioners’ story and the standard model ﬂow from different assumptions about
how domestic trade politics works; and I criticize as unrealistic the assumptions of
the standard model. In Section 5, I discuss additional reasons why the standard
model cannot explain the trade agreements we see in the real world. Section 6
concludes by discussing why all this matters.
Some preliminary remarks about why it matters may clarify my claims. Even
though trade agreements in the practitioners’ story reduce protectionism, I am
not suggesting that the practitioners’ story describes a guaranteed high road to
reducing protectionism. The practitioners’ story makes speciﬁc assumptions about
how domestic trade politics works, and the standard model makes different
assumptions. Trade negotiators should accept, and act on, whichever account is
true. If the assumptions of the standard model are true, then the mechanism of
the practitioners’ story is not available, and effort spent trying to negotiate an
agreement that reduces protectionism will be wasted. But conversely, if the
assumptions of the practitioners’ story are true, or truer (as I think they are),
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then trade negotiators who accept the standard model, and hence make no attempt
to reduce protectionism, will be missing an important opportunity. Some readers
may think that whatever difference there is between the practitioners’ story and
the standard model cannot matter in the end, because the terms of the eventual
agreement should depend only on which producer groups lobby over the
agreement, and with what force. I agree that if the same political forces are active
in both accounts when an agreement is being negotiated, then we should get the
same agreement in both accounts. But it still matters which account is true.
The reason (elaborated in Section 4) is that in the practitioners’ story, but not in the
standard model, the mere fact that the governments are looking for an agreement
changes the balance of political forces.

2. The practitioners’ story, the standard model, and the contradictions
In the practitioners’ story, governments acting unilaterally impose tariffs in order to
get political support from import-competing producers who want protection from
foreign competition. These protectionist tariffs cause deadweight losses in the home
country, but the political beneﬁt to the government outweighs those losses. But
these same governments can then beneﬁt, in many cases, from a trade agreement
that reciprocally reduces such tariffs. Each government loses political support from
its import-competing producers when it lowers its own tariff, but it can replace
that lost support with support from its exporters, who beneﬁt from the reduction of
the foreign tariff. The new support from exporters may fully replace the lost
support from import-competing producers, but it need not. Lowering the tariffs
reduces the domestic deadweight losses that the tariffs cause. So as long as exporter
support in each country comes sufﬁciently close to replacing the lost support from
import-competing producers, both governments can be made better off.
This utterly familiar story is told not just by trade lawyers and trade ofﬁcials,
but also by trade-focused political scientists, and by many international economists
when arguing informally.6 Despite this broad acceptance, there is no generally
accepted formal model of the practitioners’ story. There are genuine difﬁculties
in constructing a model, although I shall not start discussing details of
a model-building project I cannot complete. Wilfred Ethier has developed a
model in which trade agreements reduce protectionism, which I discuss brieﬂy

6 Precisely because this story is so deeply rooted in the conventional understanding of trade agreements,
it is not easy to ﬁnd completely clear statements. One particularly nice statement is Pauwelyn (2008:
559–560). Pauwelyn thinks we need a new model for future trade negotiations, but he does not doubt that
the practitioners’ story captures the core dynamic of trade negotiations past and present. The story is also
told telegraphically in, e.g., Hudec (1993: 314–316), Destler (2005: 17, 253–254) (like Pauwelyn, Destler
suggests that changing patterns of trade and the emergence of ‘trade and’ issues may be reducing the
relevance of the practitioners’ story, but certainly not in favor of the standard model); Krugman (1997:
118), Hoekman and Kostecki (2001: 27–28, 32–33).
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in Section 4.7 But it is not clear that Ethier’s model captures the practitioners’
story; and Ethier himself is not fully satisﬁed with his model. (Incidentally, Ethier
has also offered many cogent criticisms of the standard model, without having any
noticeable effect on its popularity; this is a mystery.) Before Ethier (on this topic)
there was Arye Hillman and various co-authors, who plainly held the practitioners’
view of trade agreements, but whose models also seem not to have captured
the practitioners’ story, and who also did not succeed in forestalling or dislodging
the standard model.8 It might be suggested that the unsatisfactoriness of attempts
to model the practitioners’ story indicate that it is incoherent. But in view of the
story’s wide acceptance, such a conclusion seems premature. We need more
attempts.
There is no story about the workings of the standard model that is as familiar
as the practitioners’ story. But there is a story, familiar to economists, about
the simplest case under the standard model. Imagine two similar-sized countries,
trading two goods, with national-income-maximizing governments. Each
country can beneﬁt from imposing an appropriately chosen ‘optimum tariff’.
The tariff reduces the country’s imports, and hence brings about a lower world
price for those imports (it improves the country’s terms of trade); the country in
effect collects some tariff revenue from foreign exporters (which I shall refer to
as the ‘terms-of-trade tariff revenue’). The tariff will cause some deadweight loss
in the local economy, but if the tariff is properly chosen, this loss will be
outweighed by the terms-of-trade tariff revenue. So, both countries will impose
optimum tariffs. But now, suppose the governments agree to eliminate these
tariffs. Each government will lose the terms-of-trade beneﬁt of its own optimum
tariff (the terms-of-trade tariff revenue), but it will no longer experience the
terms-of-trade loss inﬂicted by its trading partner’s optimum tariff (experienced
as reduced surplus earned by its exporters, which is a component of national
income). In effect, each government hands back the tariff revenue it was
collecting from foreign exporters. Because the countries are similar-sized, the
transfers in both directions roughly cancel out; the agreement is approximately
terms-of-trade neutral. But, of course, when each government eliminates its
optimum tariff, it also eliminates the domestic dead-weight loss from the tariff.
So an agreement to eliminate the optimum tariffs makes each government better
off; it allows each government to maintain the terms-of-trade outcome it
achieved by its unilateral optimum tariff, while avoiding the deadweight loss.9

7 Ethier (2011: 311–314), (2007: 618–620).
8 E.g., Hillman (1982), Hillman et al. (1995), Hillman and Moser (1996).
9 If the countries are of different sizes, then an agreement to simply eliminate the optimum tariffs may
not be terms-of-trade neutral, and it may fail to make the larger country better off. But a supplemental
international transfer payment can be found that will make the agreement terms-of-trade neutral; and an
agreement that incorporates such a transfer payment will make both governments better off. It will preserve
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I shall refer to this story about the simplest case under the standard model as
the ‘optimum-tariff story’.10
If we compare the practitioners’ story and the optimum-tariff story, we see two
fundamental differences. First, in the practitioners’ story, the unilateral tariffs are
motivated by the desire for political support. The tariffs that the agreement reduces
are protectionism.11 In contrast, in the optimum-tariff story, the only motive that
the national-income-maximizing governments have for a tariff is the terms-of-trade
motive. The tariffs that the agreement reduces are terms-of-trade manipulation.
Second, in the practitioners’ story, getting the agreement depends on political
support from export interests. But, in the optimum-tariff story, there is no
special-interest politics at all.12
Of course, both the Bagwell–Staiger model and the Grossman–Helpman model
allow for the possibility that governments have political-support motives as well as
terms-of-trade motives. So we cannot simply take it for granted that the optimumtariff story is a fully adequate representation of the mechanism that produces
trade agreements in the standard model. But in fact, it is, as I shall show in the rest
of this section. First, both the Bagwell–Staiger model and the Grossman–Helpman
model say that even when governments have political-support motives and engage
in protectionism, a trade agreement will eliminate only the tariffs (or the parts of
tariffs) that are motivated by terms-of-trade considerations – just what the
agreement does in the optimum-tariff story. Second, we shall see that even when
there is political motivation in the standard model, politics plays no role in
explaining why we get an agreement. Again, just as in the optimum-tariff story.

the terms-of-trade outcome each government achieved by its unilateral optimum tariff, while avoiding the
domestic deadweight losses.
10 So far as I know, this story was introduced into the modern literature by Wolfgang Mayer (1981).
Some people have been surprised that I do not attribute the story to Harry Johnson (1953–54). In earlier
drafts, I did – I thought I remembered the story from Johnson (1953–54). But Gene Grossman pointed out
to me that it was not there (and gave me the Mayer cite). Johnson (1953–54) is entirely about establishing
that a country may be better off with an optimum tariff than in free trade, even if its trading partner
retaliates; trade agreements are never mentioned. Harry Johnson (1965: 265), states the conclusion of the
optimum-tariff story, and plainly assumes that the readers all understand the story; but he does not spell it
out. Incidentally, it seems likely that both Robert Torrens and John Stuart Mill, who certainly had the idea
of optimum tariffs, also anticipated this explanation for trade agreements. See Humphrey (1987).
11 There is no reason why the practitioners’ story could not be expanded to allow for a trade agreement
that also eliminates terms-of-trade manipulation, by essentially the mechanism of the optimum-tariff story;
the practitioners’ story makes no mention of terms-of-trade manipulation, because practitioners do not
regard terms-of-trade manipulation as a signiﬁcant phenomenon in the real world. It might seem that even
a purely protectionist government must at least take note of the world-price effects of its protectionist tariff,
in order to set the tariff at the right level. But taking note of world-price effects for this purpose is not the
same as being motivated by them. Also, if import-competing producers reward the government on the basis
of the tariff (not the domestic price), then it is the producers who have to think about the world-price
effects.
12 Of course, the beneﬁt to exporters from the agreement plays an essential role in the optimum-tariff
story; but the increased exporter surplus is valued only as a component of national income, balancing the
national-income loss in tariff revenue. It gets no extra weight on political grounds.
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First, we explain why trade agreements address only terms-of-trade manipulation (and not protectionism) in the standard model. The mechanism is most
clearly displayed in the Grossman–Helpman model. Grossman and Helpman
derive a formula for the unilateral tariff in Nash equilibrium, which is additively
separable and has two terms. Grossman and Helpman say these terms reﬂect the
‘political support’ and ‘terms-of-trade’ motives, respectively.13 They point out that
the formula for the ‘political-support’ term is just the formula they had derived in
a previous article for the tariff that would be chosen by a small country facing
ﬁxed world prices.14 So the political-support term represents the tariff that would
be chosen by a large country, if it behaved as if the world price were ﬁxed at its
equilibrium level, or, in other words, if it optimized with respect to domestic prices
alone. And, of course, the political-support term includes the part of the tariff that
is attributable to protectionism, as its name indicates.15 The ‘terms-of-trade’ term
in the formula for the unilateral tariff is just the classic expression for the optimum
tariff. Notice incidentally that having an additively separable formula for the
unilateral tariff allows us to see immediately that the government will always
engage in terms-of-trade manipulation in this model. Grossman and Helpman also
derive a formula for the tariffs that will be installed by an efﬁcient trade agreement
(always meaning efﬁcient from the governments’ point of view);16 and one can see
by inspection of this formula that an agreement that installed tariffs consisting of
just the political-support terms of the unilateral tariffs, without the terms-of-trade
terms, would be efﬁcient. So an efﬁcient agreement strips out the parts of the tariffs
that result from terms-of-trade manipulation, while leaving in place the parts that
result from protectionism.17
When I say the agreement strips out the terms-of-trade manipulation and
leaves the protectionism in place, I am not claiming that the cooperative tariffs
take exactly the same values as the values of the political-support terms at the
Nash equilibrium (even though the formula is the same). World prices may
change between the non-cooperative and cooperative equilibria; and since the

13 Grossman and Helpman (1995: 688).
14 Grossman and Helpman (1994).
15 I say ‘includes’, because this term also takes account of producers’ lobbying over their consumer
surplus, which hereafter I shall continue to ignore.
16 Grossman and Helpman (1995: 700).
17 The agreement that installs tariffs equal to the ‘political-support’ terms is not the only possible
efﬁcient agreement; and in some cases it may be necessary to bargain to some other efﬁcient agreement to
have an outcome that all parties prefer to the Nash equilibrium. (Cf. note 9 supra.) But any efﬁcient
agreement must call for trade policies that in concert generate the same domestic prices in both countries,
and the same trade ﬂows, as the agreement I have singled out; any efﬁcient outcome differs from this
agreement only by an international transfer. We may think of this transfer as accomplished by cooperative
terms-of-trade manipulation, by one or more tariff-subsidy pairs. So any efﬁcient agreement can be thought
of as stripping out the unilateral terms-of trade manipulation; and leaving protectionism in place; and then
adding a transfer payment, which may of course be zero. Similar remarks apply to the Bagwell–Staiger
model.
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political-support terms are evaluated at the equilibrium world prices, they may
change as well. But the crucial point remains: in the cooperative tariffs, there is no
terms-of-trade component, and the political motive operates without constraint at
the equilibrium world prices. In that sense, the agreement strips out terms-of-trade
manipulation and leaves protectionism in place.
Turning to the Bagwell–Staiger model, notice ﬁrst that in this model, just as
in the Grossman–Helpman model, governments will always have, and act on,
terms-of-trade motivation.18 But Bagwell and Staiger also consider hypothetically
governments that do not act on the terms-of-trade motive. A government that
ignores the terms-of-trade motive will optimize with regard to the domestic relative
price, while in effect treating the world price as ﬁxed at its equilibrium level. Taking
a liberty with Bagwell and Staiger’s terminology, I shall call the tariff adopted
by such a government the ‘politically optimal tariff’. (This is a liberty, because
Bagwell and Staiger actually deﬁne the ‘politically optimal tariffs’ only as the noncooperative equilibrium tariffs that result when both governments behave this
way.) The ‘politically optimal tariff’ is the analogue, in the Bagwell–Staiger
formalism, for the ‘political-support’ term in Grossman–Helpman; it represents the
protectionist component in the unilateral tariff. Bagwell and Staiger prove that,
when adopted by both governments, the politically optimal tariffs are efﬁcient
(from the governments’ point of view, of course). Bagwell and Staiger also prove
that the Nash equilibrium tariffs, which reﬂect both the political and terms-oftrade motives, are higher than the politically optimal tariffs. So an efﬁcient trade
agreement reduces tariffs, moving us from the Nash equilibrium tariffs to
the politically optimal tariffs. In other words, just as in Grossman–Helpman, the
agreement eliminates the part of the tariff that is motivated by terms-of-trade
considerations, and it leaves in place the part of the tariff motivated by protectionist
considerations.19
The idea that a model (any model) could say trade agreements do not address
protectionism will be very counterintuitive for most readers. To make it more
intuitive, note that a protectionist tariff can be understood as a Pigovian tax that
internalizes a negative consumption externality (from the government’s point of
view) caused by the imported good. Each imported unit of the good displaces a
domestically produced unit, and lowers the import-competing producers’ proﬁts,
and thus costs the government a bit of political support. This is a negative effect
on the government that consumers do not consider, and that the ordinary operation
of the price mechanism does not internalize in the absence of a tariff. So, insofar
as the tariff reﬂects only the government’s protectionist motive, it merely

18 This follows from the bedrock assumption that the government’s welfare varies directly with the
terms of trade (in their formalism, Wpw < 0). Bagwell and Staiger (1999: 220), (2002: 19).
19 Bagwell and Staiger (2002: 23–25), (1999: 221–224) (and remember the remarks on other efﬁcient
agreements in note 17 supra.)
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neutralizes this consumption externality. Hence, protectionism is efﬁcient, from the
governments’ point of view.20
So far, we have seen that even when governments have political motives in the
standard model, the trade agreement does just what it does in the optimum-tariff
story: it eliminates (only) terms-of-trade manipulation. We turn now to showing
that the mechanism by which we get an agreement in the standard model is the
same as in the optimum-tariff story: even if governments have political motives,
politics plays no role in securing the agreement. To begin, notice that Bagwell
and Staiger’s ‘politically optimal tariffs’, which are deﬁned as the tariffs that
would be adopted in non-cooperative equilibrium by governments that ignore the
terms-of-trade motive, are perfectly well-deﬁned even for governments that have
no political motives at all (in which case they, they are zero).21 The same is true
of Grossman and Helpman’s ‘political-support’ terms.22 To avoid being misled
about the role of politics by Bagwell and Staiger’s and Grossman and
Helpman’s names for these tariffs or tariff terms (‘politically optimal tariffs’,
‘political-support’ terms), I shall rename them the ‘non-exploitive optimal tariffs’.
So the ‘non-exploitive optimal tariffs’ are deﬁned as the non-cooperative tariffs
that would be adopted by governments that ignore the terms-of-trade motive. This
is just a renaming; but it makes it easier to see that the relevant concept applies
equally, whether governments have political motives or not. In our new
terminology, what we learned in the preceding paragraphs about the Bagwell–
Staiger and Grossman–Helpman models is that the non-exploitive optimal tariffs
are efﬁcient.
Next, I deﬁne the ‘net non-exploitive return’ as the sum of all the beneﬁts and
costs to the home government of its tariff, but exclusive of the terms-of-trade
beneﬁt (or cost, in the case of an export subsidy). Once again, this deﬁnition of the
‘net non-exploitive return’ applies equally, whether governments have political
motives or not. If the government has political motives, then all the political
beneﬁts and political costs of the tariff are counted in the net non-exploitive return,
along with the cost in domestic distortion; but if the government does not
have political motives, the net non-exploitive return is just the domestic distortion.
Note that the net non-exploitive return is maximized at the non-exploitive optimal
tariff.
Now, to establish that politics plays no role in explaining why we get an
agreement in the standard model, we give a perfectly general explanation for why

20 At this point, the reader may wonder, ‘If protectionist tariffs are efﬁcient, why are they reduced in the
practitioners’ story?’ We have already hinted at the answer. In the practitioners’ story, as we explain in
Section 4, the mere fact of negotiating over an agreement changes the political forces on the government.
So what was efﬁcient before, and what is efﬁcient in the standard model, is efﬁcient no longer.
21 Bagwell and Staiger point this out (2002: 25), (1999: 223).
22 Grossman and Helpman do not point this out, but it is easily conﬁrmed by setting the parameters in
their deﬁnition of the ‘political-support’ term to reﬂect the assumption that no producer groups organize.
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we get an agreement, which makes no reference to politics at all. (The explanation
will be easily recognized as a generalization of the optimum-tariff story.) In the
standard model, rational governments always have, and act on, terms-of-trade
motives, which leads them to impose unilateral tariffs that are higher than the
non-exploitive optimal tariffs. But, for each government, the terms-of-trade beneﬁt
from having a tariff higher than the non-exploitive optimal tariff comes at the
cost of a reduction in the net non-exploitive return (which is maximized at the
non-exploitive optimal tariff). Suppose now that each government agrees to reduce
its tariff to the non-exploitive optimal level. (This corresponds to giving up the
optimum tariffs in the optimum-tariff story.) We already know such an agreement
would be efﬁcient. And if the countries are the same size, it would also be terms-oftrade neutral, so it would allow each government to secure the same terms-of-trade
outcome it gets by its unilateral terms-of-trade manipulation, without the attendant
reduction in its net non-exploitive return. So both governments can be made better
off by the agreement. If the countries are not the same size, then we may need to
supplement the move to the non-exploitive optimum with an international transfer,
to make the agreement terms-of-trade neutral. But this again gives us an agreement
that allows both governments to secure their non-cooperative terms-of-trade
outcome, without the attendant reduction in their net non-exploitive return.
So both are made better off. As promised, this is a straightforward generalization
of the optimum-tariff story.
We now have a perfectly general explanation of why there will be a trade
agreement in the standard model, which makes no reference to politics. Unilateral
terms-of-trade manipulation leads to a non-cooperative equilibrium with tariffs
higher than the non-exploitive optimum, and a terms-of-trade neutral agreement
that eliminates the terms-of-trade manipulation then moves us to the (efﬁcient) nonexploitive optimum. If political motivation is present, it is taken into account
in calculating the net non-exploitive return and the non-exploitive optimal tariffs.
So politics helps to determine the terms of the agreement. But the explanation for
why there will be an agreement is exactly the same, whether the governments
have political motives or not. And note that the fundamental description of the
terms of the agreement as the non-exploitive optimal tariffs is also exactly the same,
whether the governments have political motives or not. For understanding the
agreement, the politics is epiphenomenal.23

23 It is worth explaining concretely why getting an agreement in the standard model does not require
mobilizing exporter support (as it does in the practitioners’ story). Suppose import-competing producers
are organized, and exporters are not. There will be a loss in political support from the import-competing
producers when we move to the non-exploitive optimum, but that loss is more than compensated for just by
the reduction in the domestic deadweight loss, because moving to the non-exploitive optimum increases the
net non-exploitive return. So, we get a trade agreement even when import-competing producers are
organized, and exporters are not.
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3. Denying the contradiction between the practitioners’ story and the standard
model
We now have two stories, both plausible, which contradict each other. The
practitioners’ story claims that a trade agreement can reduce protectionism; the
standard model claims it cannot. As we shall see in Section 4, once we squarely
confront the contradiction, it is not difﬁcult to ﬁnd the reasons for it. But people
seem reluctant to confront the contradiction. Even the architects of the standard
model sometimes argue that their model can explain trade agreements that address
protectionism. In this section, I examine some of those arguments and explain
where they go wrong. The fact that they are made at all conﬁrms the deep-rooted
appeal of the practitioners’ story, and the near impossibility of actually believing
the standard model.

3.1

Is the practitioners’ story just a speciﬁc case under the standard model?

Staiger and Alan Sykes have written: ‘For Regan, the goal of trade agreements is to
eliminate protectionism. But why do governments care about protection imposed
by other governments? In our view, the answer lies in the fact that their exporters
are harmed, and earn less on their export sales than otherwise. This is precisely the
injury that terms-of-trade theory captures.’24 But, contrary to Staiger and Sykes’s
claim, the injury from protectionism is not ‘precisely the injury that terms-of-trade
theory captures’, assuming that by ‘terms-of-trade theory’ they refer to the standard
model. In the standard model, trade agreements do not reduce protectionism;
hence, they do not reduce the injury from protectionism.
It is true that in the practitioners’ story, the reason Home cares about Foreign’s
protectionism is that it harms Home’s exporters by reducing the world price of their
exports (and thus Home can get political support from its exporters for negotiating
down Foreign’s protectionism). The injury Foreign’s protectionism imposes on
Home is mediated through the terms of trade; in that respect, it is like the injury
that Foreign’s terms-of-trade manipulation imposes in the standard model. Even so,
in the standard model a trade agreement will eliminate Foreign’s terms-of-trade
manipulation (along with Home’s), and it will not reduce Foreign’s protectionism
(nor Home’s). So the injury from Foreign’s protectionism, even though it is an
injury mediated through the terms of trade, is not ‘the injury that terms-of-trade
theory captures’. In other words, the so-called ‘terms-of-trade theory’ does not
capture all ‘terms-of-trade injury’. The practitioners’ story, in which trade
agreements reduce protectionism, is not a special case of the standard model.25

24 Staiger and Sykes (2009: 31).
25 One consequence of this discussion is that the widely used phrase ‘terms-of-trade theory’ is
dangerously unspeciﬁc, and should be abolished from the literature.
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Bagwell and Staiger make the same error when discussing Cordell Hull’s
thinking behind the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.26 Hull’s reason for wanting
reciprocal liberalization was to mobilize exporter support for trade agreements;
and Bagwell and Staiger point out that exporters would beneﬁt because of
the improved world price for their exports when the foreign tariff was lowered.
True enough. But then Bagwell and Staiger say this shows that Hull’s story can
be represented in their own framework. This does not follow. We have just
explained one reason why it does not follow: the tariffs Hull meant to reduce
by his agreements, and did reduce, were protectionist tariffs,27 and in Bagwell
and Staiger’s framework, trade agreements that reduce protectionist tariffs are
impossible. A second reason is that in Hull’s story, exporter politics plays a
crucial role in securing an agreement. But we saw in Section 2 that in the standard
model politics plays no role at all in explaining why we get an agreement.
More speciﬁcally, in the standard model, we get an agreement even when importcompeting producers organize and exporters do not.28
Incidentally, Bagwell and Staiger also misstate the role of reciprocity in the
practitioners’ story when they say ‘the ability of reciprocity to neutralize the adverse
terms-of-trade implications of unilateral liberalization is the essence of [Cordell
Hull’s story]’ as well as of their own story.29 In Hull’s story, which is to say the
practitioners’ story, the government is not motivated by terms-of-trade advantage
when it imposes its tariff, and hence its objection to unilateral liberalization is not
the terms-of-trade loss. Rather, its objection is the loss of the political support
from import-competing producers that it sought when it imposed the tariff. And
the beneﬁt it seeks from its trading partner’s liberalization is not the terms-of-trade
improvement as such, but the political support from exporters that that
improvement brings.

3.2 Does the standard model allow agreements that reduce protectionism
after all?
Grossman and Henrik Horn have written a paper for the American Law Institute’s
project on WTO law that is meant to explain the economics of trade agreements
to lawyers.30 In the paper, Grossman and Horn say repeatedly that a large
country’s unilateral trade policy creates international inefﬁciencies that call for
a trade agreement regardless of the country’s objectives. Thus, ‘In our view, the
fundamental rationale for the GATT is to help governments avoid externalities

26 Bagwell and Staiger (2002: 63). Cf. Bagwell and Staiger (1999: 227, n. 20).
27 See Schattschneider (1935), Irwin (2011).
28 See note 23 supra.
29 Bagwell and Staiger (2002: 63).
30 Grossman and Horn (2012). I shall criticize one aspect of the paper. The paper also contains a great
deal of valuable material about the structure of trade agreements, and how they develop over time, which
I do not discuss.
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from unilateral determination of policies. These externalities arise when governments reduce import demand in order to achieve their domestic policy objectives.’31
‘[T]he reason why governments prefer to invoke trade barriers is not important.’32
‘The more fundamental problem caused by unilateral tariff setting is that
governments reduce trade volumes in order to achieve their objectives, whatever
they may be.’33 These quotes suggest that even pure protectionism creates the
grounds for a trade agreement. But Grossman and Horn give no explanation
of how a trade agreement can reduce protectionism. As we shall see, the only
explanation they give for trade agreements is the standard model, in which the
agreement will not address protectionism.
There is a sense in which Grossman and Horn are right that, in their model, there
will be a trade agreement whatever the government’s purpose. In their model, the
government will always act on the terms-of-trade motive, whatever other objects
the government may or may not have;34 and this terms-of-trade manipulation
will always provide the grounds for a trade agreement. But the statements quoted in
the previous paragraph seem to suggest that protectionism by itself would give rise
to a trade agreement, which is a different claim, and inconsistent with their model.
Grossman and Horn appear to offer two explanations for trade agreements;
but the explanations are in fact the same, and they are both the standard model.
Section 4 of their paper sets out what they refer to as the ‘National Market Power
Model’, which is straightforwardly the standard model. Grossman and Horn ﬁrst
explain the traditional optimum tariff for a national-income-maximizing country;35 then they explain why such an optimum tariff is globally inefﬁcient, and they
give the optimum-tariff explanation for a trade agreement between two countries
with optimum tariffs;36 then, citing Bagwell and Staiger, they point out that even
if governments have political motives and engage in protectionism, they will still
also ‘exploit national market power’, and so ‘fundamentally the same explanation
for the existence of trade agreements’ applies as with national-income-maximizing
governments.37 Here Grossman and Horn are explicit that the explanation for the
trade agreement depends on the fact that the governments engage in terms-of-trade
manipulation (whether or not they also engage in protectionism).

31 Ibid.: 61.
32 Ibid.: 19.
33 Ibid.: 45.
34 See text between notes 15 and 16 supra (which, strictly speaking, was about the Grossman–
Helpman model, but it is all the same). See also the further arguments in each of the next three paragraphs.
And note Grossman and Horn’s statement: ‘Governments may set positive tariffs to cater to particular
constituents, but the resulting tariffs will be even greater than what would result from constituent pressures
due to the temptation they have to exploit national market power’. Ibid.: 42.
35 Ibid.: 33–36.
36 Ibid.: 36–38.
37 Ibid.: 42.
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Section 3 of Grossman and Horn sets out an ‘International Externalities Model’
of trade agreements. Grossman and Horn appear to suggest that this model is more
general. But we shall see that even in this model, the authors implicitly assume
that governments engage in terms-of-trade manipulation, and they explain only
why there will be an agreement to eliminate that; there is no explanation of how
an agreement could eliminate protectionism. First, Grossman and Horn impose
three assumptions about each government’s objective function: (1) starting from
a zero tariff, the government has an incentive to raise the tariff; (2) as Home’s tariff
is gradually increased, with Foreign’s tariff held constant, Home’s welfare ﬁrst
increases and then declines; (3) Home is always hurt by an increase in Foreign’s
tariff.38 Next, they expound the concepts of a best response function and a Nash
equilibrium, and they give a diagrammatic explanation of why a trade agreement
can make both countries better off than in the Nash equilibrium.39 They also give a
very brief ‘mathematics-in-words’ explanation. They explain that, starting from the
Nash equilibrium, ‘A small change in the Home tariff would reduce the Home
government’s welfare only slightly (because a near-optimal choice yields almost
the same welfare as an optimal choice), but would provide clear political gains to
the Foreign government. [And similarly, mutatis mutandis, for a small change in
Foreign’s tariff.]’40 This is a solid argument, but on analysis it turns out to be just a
new version of the familiar argument that terms-of-trade manipulation will create
the occasion for a trade agreement. Grossman and Horn’s assumptions guarantee
that the governments will engage in terms-of-trade manipulation. To see why,
notice ﬁrst that their assumption (3) tells us two things: it tells us that each country
is large; and it also tells us that each government’s welfare function depends
directly on the terms of trade. Also, by deﬁnition, in the Nash equilibrium each
government optimizes. (Grossman and Horn rely on that fact when they say that
a small change in Home’s tariff has a negligible effect on Home’s welfare.) But if
some country is large, so that the government can affect the terms of trade, and
if the government’s welfare function depends directly on the terms of trade, and
if the government optimizes, then the government will necessarily engage in termsof-trade manipulation. So what Grossman and Horn prove in their Section 3 is still
just the familiar proposition that when governments engage in terms-of-trade
manipulation, there is room for a trade agreement. Their argument suggests no
reason to think that the trade agreement will do anything more than eliminate the
terms-of-trade manipulation. This is still the standard model.
Grossman and Horn also describe a concrete example in which they claim that
a trade agreement will reduce protectionism. But the example does not work.
Grossman and Horn consider what happens in the Grossman–Helpman model

38 Ibid.: 18–19.
39 Ibid.: 19–24.
40 Ibid.: 23.
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if (a) the government puts a zero weight on social welfare and cares only about its
campaign contributions, and (b) special-interest groups constitute only a negligibly
small proportion of the population and hence receive only a negligible fraction of
the tariff revenue, so that they do not lobby over tariff revenue. As Grossman and
Horn say: ‘In this case, governments will choose their tariffs solely in view of the
campaign contributions they are offered, which will in turn be based on the
protection that special interests gain from tariffs and not on the revenues that are
generated.’ Grossman and Horn claim that even in this situation, where the tariffs
are pure protectionism, the tariffs will still be inefﬁciently high, and there will be a
trade agreement.41 But, in fact, if we set the parameters of the Grossman–Helpman
model to reﬂect assumptions (a) and (b), the unilateral tariffs and the tariffs
required by an efﬁcient agreement become either inﬁnite or indeterminate
(depending on whether the relevant sector is organized or not).42 So we cannot
make assumptions (a) and (b) concurrently without going beyond the domain of
the Grossman–Helpman model. This is another route to our previous conclusion
that there must always be terms-of-trade manipulation in the model, which
explains the trade agreement. Grossman and Horn have given no explanation of
how a trade agreement might reduce protectionism, either in the Grossman–
Helpman model, or in their own general approach.

4. Accounting for the difference between the practitioners’ story and the
standard model
Once one confronts squarely the fact that the practitioners’ story and the standard
model say very different things about trade agreements, it is not hard to explain
the difference. The practitioners’ story and the standard model make different
assumptions about which producer groups lobby in which contexts, and for what;
and they also make different assumptions about what favors governments are
willing to provide.
The practitioners’ story treats exporters as inert in the non-cooperative context.
Exporters rouse themselves only to lobby in favor of some proposed trade
agreement. Of course, proponents of the practitioners’ story are aware that in the
real world some exporters lobby for and even secure unilateral export subsidies.

41 Ibid.: 42–43.
42 It is not necessary or convenient to reproduce here the complete formulas for the unilateral and
cooperative tariffs. The crucial bit is the ﬁrst multiplicand in the ﬁrst term of the unilateral tariff (which is
also the only term of the cooperative tariff). This multiplicand is (IiL – αL)/(a + αL), where IiL is an indicator
variable that equals one if industry i is organized and zero otherwise; αL is the fraction of all voters that
belong to organized industries; and a represents the government’s weighting of a dollar of social welfare
compared to a dollar of campaign contributions. Now, assumption (a) in the text means that a = 0, and
assumption (b) in the text means that αL = 0. So the multiplicand becomes (1 – 0)/(0 +0), which is inﬁnite, if
the relevant industry is organized, and (0 – 0)/(0 + 0), which is indeterminate, if the relevant industry is not
organized. See Grossman and Helpman (1995: 688, 700).
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But that is not a problem, as long as there are some exporter groups that do
not lobby (or do not lobby successfully) in the non-cooperative context, but who
would lobby for a trade agreement. Those are the groups that are necessary for the
practitioners’ story to produce a trade agreement.
The standard model, in contrast, assumes that any exporters who would lobby
in the cooperative context for a trade agreement also lobby in the non-cooperative
context.43 In the Grossman–Helpman model, they lobby for export subsidies.
In the Bagwell–Staiger model, they lobby against a tariff. But, of course, their
lobbying against a tariff in the Bagwell–Staiger model could in principle result in an
import subsidy, which would be equivalent to an export subsidy in this two-good
model. So we can regard exporters in the Bagwell–Staiger model either as lobbying
against a tariff or as lobbying for an export subsidy, and we shall adopt both
perspectives in our discussion below.
Both versions of the standard model share another important assumption. They
assume that governments make no distinction between the ﬁscal cost of beneﬁtting
exporters through a trade agreement (which takes the form of tariff revenue
foregone) and the ﬁscal cost of beneﬁtting exporters through a subsidy (which
takes the form of out-of-pocket expenditure). This assumption is at odds with the
practitioners’ conventional wisdom, which assumes governments will be less
willing to spend on subsidies than to give up tariff revenue.
So, the practitioners’ story and the standard model make different assumptions,
both about who lobbies when and for what, and about the government’s
willingness to respond in various ways. These assumptions explain the different
conclusions about whether trade agreements will reduce protectionism. In the
standard model, any exporters who would lobby for a trade agreement also lobby
in the non-cooperative context, and the government is as willing to beneﬁt them by
subsidies as by a trade agreement. As a consequence, it turns out that whatever the
government would have been willing to do for these exporters by making a trade
agreement, it will already have done for them by unilateral tariff-reductions
or subsidies. There will simply be nothing left for a trade agreement to do on the
political front (which is why the trade agreement will address terms-of-trade
manipulation, but not protectionism). In contrast, in the practitioners’ story, there
are at least some exporters who lobby (or who lobby successfully) only in the
cooperative context. So the political forces for liberalization are not fully active
in the non-cooperative context, and the political forces for protection are
effectively over-represented in that context. That is why an agreement will reduce
protectionism.44

43 Bagwell and Staiger assume this implicitly by having the same welfare function for the government in
the non-cooperative and cooperative contexts. Grossman and Helpman use the same index variable to
represent ‘organized/unorganized’ in both the non-cooperative and the cooperative contexts.
44 Notice that even though trade agreements reduce protectionism in the practitioners’ story, and not in
the standard model, it does not follow that we are better off if the practitioners’ story is true. Because
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Which account of trade agreements makes the more plausible assumptions?
The argument for the assumptions of the standard model is simple: the behavior
the standard model assumes is required of informed and rational agents, whether
exporters or governments. It would be irrational for exporters who would lobby
for a trade agreement not to lobby for unilateral policies that would secure
equivalent beneﬁts for themselves. And it would be irrational for a government
to distinguish between tariff revenue foregone and out-of-pocket expenditure on
subsidies, since they are both just reductions in the ﬁscal balance.
And yet, most people, both practitioners and economists in their informal
thinking, implicitly assume that some exporters are active only when an agreement
is under discussion. Why might that be? Let us start with an issue that is not the
most important, but is a convenient point of entry. In the Bagwell–Staiger model,
exporters lobby against tariffs in the unilateral context. Bagwell and Staiger have
argued that to assume otherwise is to assume exporters cannot be brought to
understand Lerner equivalence.45 But if we look at the real world, we don’t seem to
see many exporters lobbying against tariffs. Jagdish Bhagwati has written,
concerning the proposition that protectionism damages exporters: ‘[I]t is not
uncommon to ﬁnd trained economists who fail to grasp the relationship. It is not
surprising, therefore, that export interests have not generally been mobilized in
opposition to import-competing industries’ demands for protection.’46 Even if
exporters do grasp the relationship, there can still be reasons for them not to lobby
against unilateral tariffs. As Wilfred Ethier has pointed out, in a world with many
goods, exporters can know in principle that their own government’s tariffs hurt
exports, without knowing in practice just how much any particular tariff harms
exports of any particular good. So no exporter group knows how much it should
pay for what reductions in which home tariffs. In contrast, exporters can see just
how they will be beneﬁted by a reduction in Foreign’s tariff on their product.47
Robert Hudec also observed that exporters mostly do not lobby against tariffs, but
he offers yet a third explanation: ‘It is often very bad public relations to oppose a
fellow citizen’s petition for help from his/her government when there is no visible
direct interest at stake.’ In effect, each producer group treats trade policies as
primarily the business of the producers directly affected; so even though exporters
are indirectly affected by tariffs, they treat tariffs as not really their business, and
they leave lobbying over tariffs to import-competing producer groups. But Hudec
goes on to note that exporter groups can lobby for trade agreements, because then

exporters are fully active in the non-cooperative context in the standard model, there will be less (net)
protectionism to worry about in the standard model. So we may be equally well off whichever account is
true – provided that we know which account is true, and guide our actions concerning trade agreements by
the true account.
45 Bagwell and Staiger (2002: 31).
46 Bhagwati (1988: 73).
47 Ethier (2004: 305–06); cf. Destler (2005: 5).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://
doi.org/10.1017/S1474745614000469

Explaining Trade Agreements: The Practitioners’ Story and the Standard Model 409

they are not just lobbying against their own country’s tariffs, they are lobbying for
a reduction in foreign tariffs, which will affect them directly.48
This raises the question of why the practitioners’ story implicitly assumes that
(at least) some exporters do not lobby for export subsidies, which also affect them
directly. One possible answer is that most exporters do not lobby for export
subsidies, because they think they are unlikely to get them. Arthur Dunkel and
Frieder Roessler, discussing a different but related issue, have suggested that
governments are reluctant to offer production subsidies to import-competing
industries as an alternative to tariffs because of the expenditure involved, even
when the subsidy would be more efﬁcient.49 This example is specially signiﬁcant
because the subsidy Dunkel and Roessler were considering does not have the termsof-trade cost associated with an export subsidy. (A production subsidy for an
import-competing industry would improve the terms of trade.) So the example
suggests by extension that even a government that is not concerned with the
terms-of-trade cost of an export subsidy might still be reluctant to help exporters by
that means. For a different example, consider that in a purely domestic context it is
usually easier for an interest group to get a subsidy in the form of a tax expenditure
than to get the same subsidy by an explicit transfer. This would appear as
irrationality on the part of the government in any formal model that looks only
at the balance in the treasury. But it may not be irrational at all (from the
government’s point of view) in a larger political and cultural context. For example,
the government may prefer the tax expenditure because it is a less transparent
mechanism for conferring focused beneﬁts; or it may prefer it because the tax
expenditure can be sold in some quarters as a tax cut; or because using the tax
expenditure mechanism reduces the overall budget, even though it does not affect
the balance.
There may be other reasons of political culture why export subsidies seem so
much less popular than tariffs as an instrument of politically motivated trade
policy. For example, there is a tendency in the general political culture to
understand trade relations through the metaphor of a war for markets. In this war,
tariffs are defensive weapons, holding the home territory for its natural occupants,
domestic producers. In contrast, export subsidies are offensive weapons, seeking to
annex foreign market territory. In the modern world, we are suspicious of invaders,
even when the invaders are us. The international trade community seems to share
this bias. The GATT/WTO has never proposed to eliminate tariffs completely, even
though it attempts to reduce them. Export subsidies, in contrast, are absolutely
prohibited by the WTO,50 and they were strongly discouraged even in the GATT.51

48 Hudec (1993: 315–316).
49 Dunkel and Roessler (2012: 224–225).
50 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Art. 3.1(a).
51 GATT Art. XVI, Section B.
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The last three paragraphs are far removed from any formal model. But
considerations of political culture are real, even when they are amorphous. They
may account for behavior by governments or exporters that would be irrational
in the standard model, or in any familiar sort of model. They may explain why that
behavior is perfectly rational in the context of real-world politics.
Our discussion strongly suggests that the governments’ reluctance to grant
export subsidies is the reason, or an important reason, why we need a trade
agreement to reduce protectionism. Wilfred Ethier has produced a model that
conﬁrms the basic idea here, although in his model the government is not unwilling
to beneﬁt exporters by export subsidies, but is unable to do so because of its trading
partner’s countervailing duty [CVD] laws.52 This is a good story. It is not obviously
the practitioners’ story, which makes no mention of CVD laws. But, of course,
the practitioners’ story in itself gives no other reason for the limited use of export
subsidies, so this might be as good a way of expanding it as any. Ethier is
dissatisﬁed with the fact that his model works only if we assume away terms-oftrade motivation completely,53 but that might be no stumbling block for most
believers in the practitioners’ story. For myself, I suspect the political culture
considerations are at least as important as foreign CVD laws in explaining why
exporters are not fully served by unilateral policy. But no one, including
proponents of the practitioners’ story, has focused sufﬁciently on these issues.
In sum, the assumptions of the standard model have the advantage of abstract
rationality (and concomitant ease of modeling), but the assumptions of the
practitioners’ story seem more plausible as a description of the real world.

5. Does the standard model explain trade agreements?
There is much about actual trade agreements that the standard model cannot
explain. In Section 5.2 below, I will identify a number of speciﬁc features of existing
agreements that the model cannot explain. But ﬁrst, in Section 5.1, we look at
a broader failure. The standard model does not provide a plausible explanation
of why there are trade agreements at all.

5.1

Does the standard model explain the existence of trade agreements?

According to the standard model, trade agreements are about eliminating terms-oftrade manipulation. So the model cannot be taken to explain trade agreements
unless countries actually engage in terms-of-trade manipulation, or would do so
except for existing trade agreements that constrain them. The evidence suggests that
countries do not, and would not, engage in terms-of-trade manipulation (or
certainly not to the extent necessary to explain existing trade agreements).

52 Ethier (2011: 311–314), (2007: 618–620).
53 Ethier (2007: 618).
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For a start, the standard rhetoric of trade makes virtually no reference to
terms-of-trade manipulation, neither as a policy that countries adopt, nor as a
problem for trade agreements to solve. (In contrast, the rhetoric abounds with
discussion of protectionism, and the desirability of reducing protectionism by trade
agreements.) Bagwell and Staiger acknowledge that practitioners do not talk about
terms-of-trade manipulation, and that this casts doubt on the practical relevance
of their model. In response, they point out that practitioners talk a great deal about
market access. So, to defend the relevance of their model, Bagwell and Staiger
argue that ‘we may interpret . . . ‘terms-of-trade gain’ and ‘market-access restriction’
as . . . phrases that describe the single economic experience that occurs when the
domestic government raises its import tariff and restricts foreign access to its
market’.54
This defense of their model, suggesting that ‘market-access restriction’ and
‘terms-of-trade gain’ are equivalent concepts, misses the mark. It is true that if we
focus on the effects of a tariff, market access restriction and terms-of-trade gain go
hand in hand. And it is also true (as we saw in Section 3.1) that when Home, as a
demandeur in trade negotiations, seeks to help its exporters by securing greater
access to Foreign’s market, it can be thought of as seeking improved terms of trade.
But neither of these propositions is relevant to the question that is crucial for
Bagwell and Staiger − the question of whether governments engage in termsof-trade manipulation. That is a question about governments’ motivation for
imposing tariffs. And once we focus on the motivation (not effects) for unilateral
policy (not negotiation), market access restriction and terms-of-trade gain are not
equivalent. Purely protectionist tariffs aim at restricting market access in order to
raise the domestic price; but, by deﬁnition, purely protectionist tariffs do not aim
at terms-of-trade gain, even though a terms-of-trade gain will result. In fact, the
terms-of-trade gain works against the achievement of the protectionist goal of
raising the domestic price. Ceteris paribus, the reduction of the world price of the
import good lowers the domestic price − just the opposite of what the government
wants. So although the purely protectionist government is aiming at market access
restriction to raise the domestic price, and it incidentally achieves a terms-of-trade
gain, it deﬁnitely is not aiming at the terms-of-trade gain. Bagwell and Staiger’s
claimed equivalence between market-access restriction and terms-of-trade gain
breaks down when we are considering how non-cooperative tariffs are motivated.
In other words, it breaks down exactly where it matters for Bagwell and Staiger’s
attempt to defend their model against doubts that countries engage in termsof-trade manipulation. Pointing out the universal concern with market access

54 Bagwell and Staiger (2002: 28–29). For simplicity, I have omitted Bagwell and Staiger’s references to
‘cost shifting’, which they list as a third equivalent. The treatment of cost shifting would be the same as the
treatment of terms-of-trade gain. Unlike market-access restriction, cost shifting is equivalent to terms-oftrade gain in all contexts.
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therefore tells us nothing about whether governments manipulate their terms
of trade.
Bagwell and Staiger have another response to the objection that governments
do not talk about the terms of trade. They remind us that governments that do not
talk about the terms of trade, and even governments that never think in those terms,
might nonetheless be making decisions by some procedure that has the operative
effect of terms-of-trade manipulation. But notice that governments cannot be
manipulating the terms of trade, even unconsciously, if they pay no attention to
tariff revenue in their decision-making. Tariff revenue is where the beneﬁt of
terms-of-trade manipulation (by tariff-setting) shows up.55 If we can take the
United States as representative of the large, developed countries that have been the
drivers of trade negotiation (at least until very recently), then such countries have
not engaged in terms-of-trade manipulation. In the classic studies of United States
trade policy from the Hawley-Smoot period to the present, there is not one word
to suggest that tariffs were ever motivated in even the slightest degree by the
desire for tariff revenue (whether to be deposited in the treasury or distributed
to the citizenry).56 Which means that during the past eighty-odd years, the
United States has not engaged in terms-of-trade manipulation, not even when it
was unconstrained by any trade agreements. The history is clear that even when
United States tariffs were at their highest, they were pure protectionism.57
We can also ﬁnd direct behavioral evidence of the weakness or absence of the
terms-of-trade motive by considering the instruments of unilateral trade policy that
governments employ. There are some widely used trade policy instruments that
may, in principle, reﬂect either protectionism or terms-of-trade manipulation,
tariffs being the most obvious example. But there are also many commonly used

55 Cf. Ethier (2007: 611).
56 E.g., Schattschneider (1935), Irwin (2011), Baldwin (1985), Destler (2005). Three speciﬁc points:
(1) Note that Schattschneider and Irwin are writing about a time when the United States was not
signiﬁcantly constrained by trade agreements. (2) There is one episode in Destler where the government is
concerned with tariff revenue: it was a political hurdle for the WTO agreement that the budget rules of the
time required the projected $12 billion loss of tariff revenue over ﬁve years to be offset by other revenue
increases or spending cuts. But this reﬂected a budgetary concern, not a concern with the terms of trade.
The problematic budget rule applied to any tax cut; and in the case of the WTO, the projected beneﬁt to
exporters from a terms-of-trade neutral trade agreement did not count as a relevant offset (as it should, if
the objection to the tariff cut was the terms-of-trade loss). Destler (2005: 217, 225). (3) Finally, I have been
told by former staffers in relevant Congressional ofﬁces that no one thinks about the tariff revenue when
considering tariffs; but I have not attempted a systematic survey.
57 Schattschneider (1935), Irwin (2011). For some discussion of why governments might not attend to
tariff revenue or engage in terms-of-trade manipulation, see Regan (2006: 981–982). The central point is
that governments are not unitary rational actors; they are big, complicated bureaucracies, in which
different agencies focus on different issues and respond to different constituencies. Also, few agencies have
the direct right to spend the revenue they bring in. It has been suggested to me that the United States may
not be representative, that the European Union might be more inclined to engage in terms-of-trade
manipulation, because tariff revenue goes into the European treasury (as opposed to national treasuries),
where it is a much bigger part of the budget. This is a matter that deserves study.
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instruments that can only be motivated by protectionism, because they damage the
home country’s terms of trade, such as voluntary export restraints [VER’s] sought
by the importing country, or import quotas assigned in a way that allows the
exporters to collect the quota rents. Also, in those cases where export subsidies
are granted, the motivation must be political (although not ‘protectionism’ as we
have deﬁned it), since export subsidies damage the home country’s terms of trade.58
Conversely, there is no commonly used trade instrument that causes a politicalsupport loss and hence must be motivated by terms-of-trade gain. Export taxes
are relatively rare; and the few export taxes we see are usually protectionism
for domestic consumers or users of the good in question. In sum, there is little or
no actual trade behavior from which we can infer that terms-of-trade motivation
must be operative. And even if terms-of-trade motivation is operative to some
degree, the common use of instruments like VER’s that buy political gain at the cost
of terms-of-trade loss, and the rarity of instruments like export taxes that buy
terms-of-trade gain at a political cost, show that the terms-of-trade motive must
be very weak compared to the protectionist motive.
In an important recent paper, Broda, Limão, and Weinstein purport to
demonstrate by an econometric analysis that countries engage in terms-of-trade
manipulation in tariff setting.59 They argue that there is a correlation between
market power and tariff levels, both across countries and across goods within
countries. But even if this is true, we cannot infer that countries engage in termsof-trade manipulation. To be sure, the correlations Broda, Limão, and Weinstein
identify would appear in the tariffs of countries engaged in terms-of-trade
manipulation. But they could also very plausibly appear in the tariffs of countries
motivated solely by protectionism. If the government has a purely politically
determined target for the domestic price of the import good, established without
reference to its market power, then the tariff will still be correlated with market
power, because greater market power means that a higher tariff is required to
achieve any particular price for domestic producers. Given that we have abundant
other evidence of protectionism, and no other evidence for terms-of-trade
manipulation, we should not infer terms-of-trade manipulation from this study.60
Essentially the same point applies to a recent paper by Bagwell and Staiger.61
They point out that in their model of trade agreements, ‘trade negotiations should
cut tariffs the most on those products and for those countries where the

58 For additional examples and further discussion, see Ethier (2013: 254–257), Regan (2006:
975–978). Even anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties are not motivated by terms-of-trade gain, at
least in cases where they succeed in eliminating the dumping or subsidization and then must be removed
themselves; such duties ultimately achieve a protectionist gain for the importing country at the cost of
a terms-of-trade loss.
59 Broda et al. (2008).
60 For a formal statement of this criticism of Broda, Limão, and Weinstein, and for additional
criticisms, see Ethier (2012).
61 Bagwell and Staiger (2011). The same point applies also to Ludema and Mayda (2013).
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international cost-shifting motives under unilateral tariff-setting are greatest’.62
And they then present empirical evidence that they say provides ‘strong and robust
support’ for this prediction.63 But as with the Broda, Limão, Weinstein study, the
empirical evidence Bagwell and Staiger present seems equally consistent with
the practitioners’ story. The cases where the ‘cost-shifting motives . . . are greatest’
are cases where Home has greatest market power, and substantial import volume.
But these are also the cases where a purely protectionist tariff by Home imposes the
greatest harm on Foreign’s exporters in achieving any particular domestic price for
Home’s import-competing producers. So they are the cases where it should be
easiest for purely protectionist governments to ﬁnd an agreement that allows each
side to replace support from import-competing producers with support from
exporters, as in the practitioners’ story. Just as with the Broda, Limão, Weinstein
paper, Bagwell and Staiger’s evidence appears to be as consistent with a world of
purely protectionist governments as with a world of terms-of-trade manipulators.
In sum, we have empirical evidence that market power matters to tariff levels,
both unilateral tariff levels (Broda, Limão, and Weinstein) and negotiated tariff
levels (Bagwell and Staiger). But intuitively, the practitioners’ story accounts for
that just as well as the standard model.64
The econometric studies fail to discriminate between the possibility that
governments are terms-of-trade manipulators and the possibility that they are
purely protectionist. But we have seen other evidence that does discriminate,
both behavioral evidence (facts about the use of various instruments of trade
policy) and reportorial evidence (the histories that suggest no role for tariff revenue
in policy choice). This evidence tells us that the terms-of-trade motive is either
weak, or absent. Hence, trade agreements must be about something other than
terms-of-trade manipulation.

5.2

Does the standard model explain the particular features of the WTO?

I have argued that the standard model does not explain the existence of trade
agreements. We can also focus the argument on particular features of trade
agreements. If we consider the WTO, there are many features that make no sense if
we imagine the agreement is solely about terms-of-trade manipulation, but that
make perfect sense if the agreement is about reducing protectionism. Because I have
discussed these points elsewhere,65 I will provide no more here than a summary.
Some features, of course, make sense whether the agreement is about terms-of-trade

62 Bagwell and Staiger (2011: 1239).
63 Ibid. at 1271.
64 Ethier (2006) discusses another group of empirical studies that are thought to support the standard
model (in particular the Grossman–Helpman formulation), because they show that governments respond
to political motivation when setting tariffs. But as Ethier points out, these studies do nothing to support the
standard model in preference to the practitioners’ story (or Ethier’s ‘exchange of market access model’).
65 Regan (2006: 978–981).
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manipulation or protectionism: GATT Article II on ‘Schedules of Concessions’,
for example. But other features make sense only if the agreement aims at reducing
protectionism, because the targeted behaviors cannot be terms-of-trade manipulation: for example, the prohibition of VER’s induced by the importing country; the
prohibition in GATT Article XI of complete import and export embargoes and
of import quotas that are assigned to foreign exporters without charge; and the
prohibition of export subsidies. In contrast, there are no features of the agreement that can only be explained by a concern with terms-of-trade manipulation.
Furthermore, there are many places where the WTO passes up chances to restrain
terms-of-trade manipulation, suggesting that any worry about terms-of-trade
manipulation must be limited at best: for example, the lack of any constraint on
export taxes; the fact that GATT Article III forbids only discriminatory internal
measures (since non-discriminatory internal measures can be used for terms-oftrade manipulation, even though they cannot be protectionism); and the requirement of injury to the domestic import-competing industry in the Safeguards
Agreement. In sum, analogously to our survey of unilateral trade behavior, we
ﬁnd some features of the agreements that could be designed to restrain either
protectionism or terms-of-trade manipulation; some features that make sense
only in an agreement aimed at protectionism; and some features that indicate
the absence of any strong concern with terms-of-trade manipulation. We ﬁnd no
features that require us to think the agreement is concerned with terms-of-trade
manipulation to any degree. The standard model does not explain the agreements
we actually have.

6. Why it matters which explanation of trade agreements is correct
Understanding correctly what an efﬁcient trade agreement will do is essential to
intelligent treaty design. If the standard model is correct in saying that an efﬁcient
trade agreement will address only terms-of-trade manipulation, then every instance
in Section 5.2 of a feature of the WTO agreement that cannot be explained on
these grounds is in fact a design ﬂaw, and should be changed. We should have
no ban on VER’s induced by the importing country; no prohibition of complete
import or export embargoes, or of quotas simply assigned to foreign countries
without payment; no prohibition of export subsidies; and so on. Furthermore, if we
are genuinely worried about terms-of-trade manipulation, we should restrain
export taxes; we should have no injury requirement in the Safeguards Agreement;
we should have more disciplines on non-discriminatory internal regulation; and
so on.
On the other hand, if the practitioners’ view is correct, and the standard model
is wrong, then it would be a disaster for trade negotiators to accept and be guided
by the standard model. They would no longer maintain existing limits on
protectionism or seek to impose new limits, and the world would lose the primary
beneﬁt that trade agreements bring. Or consider the effect if the WTO Appellate
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Body accepted the standard model. If they were reviewing some measure for
WTO-consistency, in a context where they needed to interpret the relevant treaty
provision in light of the treaty’s purpose, they could ﬁnd themselves arguing:
‘We think this measure was motivated by protectionism. Therefore, as the standard
model tells us, it is not the sort of measure the treaty was designed to restrain.
Therefore it is legal.’ I trust that sounds as wrong to most readers as it does to me.
At present, there seems to be no danger that trade negotiators and adjudicators
will abandon the practitioners’ story for the standard model. The standard model
has been around for 20 years, without affecting the practitioners’ belief that trade
agreements are about reducing protectionism. Still, it is worth reminding ourselves
of the gulf that separates the practitioners’ story and the standard model, as a precautionary measure. Also, if more economists confronted squarely the inconsistency between the practitioners’ story and the standard model, we might get
formal models of the practitioners’ story that lead to unpredictable new insights,
with practical import for the negotiation process and for treaty interpretation.
In any event, just understanding better a phenomenon as important as trade
agreements is valuable in itself.
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